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Abstract
Faced with fundamental societal changes such as partisan dealignment and mediatisation, political 
parties in Germany as well as in other Western democracies professionalise their communication. 
Drawing on the concept of professionalisation of political communication, the present study 
investigates changes of campaign posters for German Bundestag elections from 1949 until 2017 
with regard to personalisation, de-ideologisation and negative campaigning. By using a quantitative 
content analysis of visual and textual elements of campaign posters (N = 1,857) and logistic 
regression analyses, we found an increase in visual personalisation and in visual ideologisation. 
However, no upwards trend was detected regarding negative campaigning across the four phases 
of political campaigning. Moreover, we found no empirical evidence for an increasing textual 
personalisation or textual de-ideologisation. All in all, the findings of this longitudinal analysis 
indicate an increasing visualisation of political communication.
Keywords
Campaign posters, de-ideologisation, negative campaigning, personalisation, professionalisation
Political parties are forced to adapt to an emerging electoral market as well as to the 
pivotal role of media logic in light of the fundamental societal changes of partisan dea-
lignment (Dalton, 2014) and mediatisation (Strömbäck and Esser, 2017). This transfor-
mation, occurring since the 1960s, affects both political parties’ organisational structure 
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and their communication strategies and can best be described as professionalisation 
(Gibson and Römmele, 2001; Negrine and Lilleker, 2002; Negrine et al., 2007). The 
professionalisation of political communication becomes especially apparent during elec-
tion campaigns in parties’ own communication channels such as campaign posters. 
Several researchers have identified personalisation, de-ideologisation and negative cam-
paigning as strategies of professionalised political communication (Holtz-Bacha, 2002; 
Schweitzer, 2008; Vliegenthart, 2012). With regard to election campaigns, the profes-
sionalisation of political communication has been systemised by several phase models 
(Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Gibson and Römmele, 2001). While the assumption of a 
time-bound use of different campaigning tools has been contested (Magin et al., 2017), 
phase models still might be helpful to characterise the evolution of a certain campaigning 
tool used continuously over time.
Despite the emergence of newer campaigning tools, German election campaigns are 
characterised by a vivid poster culture. Due to regulations on televised advertising in 
Germany as well as in other European countries (Holtz-Bacha, 2017), campaign posters 
have remained an important visual campaigning tool for German election advertising 
(Holtz-Bacha and Lessinger, 2017). During the 2017 Bundestag election campaign, 
political parties distributed up to 371,000 campaign posters and spent up to 39% of their 
campaign budgets on this tool.1 Spread in public spaces, campaign posters can hardly be 
avoided and reach almost the whole German electorate. For instance, 94% of the voters 
have seen campaign posters during the 2017 Bundestag election campaign (Roßteutscher 
et al., 2018). Given their wide reach, campaign posters are meant to inform the electorate 
about the parties’ programme and candidates, signal strength, mobilise adherents and 
convince undecided voters (Dumitrescu, 2012).
In spite of the importance of campaign posters for German election campaigns, until 
now far too little attention has been paid to this means of communication with regard to 
political parties’ use of professionalised strategies. Instead, several studies have investi-
gated campaign posters in terms of their anatomy (Dumitrescu, 2010), their functions in 
practitioners’ views (Dumitrescu, 2012), their perception (Geise, 2011) or their effects 
(Matthes and Schmuck, 2017). Longitudinal studies on campaign posters revealed an 
increasing personalisation in Austrian election campaigns (Hayek, 2016) and an increas-
ing use of images of political leaders as well as a decrease in the use of ideological sym-
bols in Dutch election campaigns (Vliegenthart, 2012). Regarding negative campaigning, 
these analyses are in line with a recent study by Johansson (2014), which showed rela-
tively low levels of negativity for Swedish campaign posters. However, there is still need 
for empirical studies that consider all strategies of professionalised political communica-
tion in a long-term perspective systemised by the phases of political campaigning.
Against this background, this study aims at analysing changes in political campaign-
ing with regard to personalisation, de-ideologisation and negative campaigning by focus-
ing on campaign posters for German Bundestag elections in the period from 1949 to 
2017. Empirically, the study relies on a quantitative content analysis of visual and textual 
elements of campaign posters.
The present study adds to the existing literature in two ways. On the one hand, based 
on a suitably large dataset, it provides new empirical evidence for the professionalisation 
of political campaigning in general. On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, it is 
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the first longitudinal study that includes all four phases of political campaigning and, 
therefore, contributes to the theoretical discussion on different phase models of political 
campaigning.
The article is structured as follows. We begin by examining the concept of profes-
sionalisation of political communication. Next, we review our methodology and present 
the results of the quantitative content analysis focusing on personalisation, de-ideologi-
sation and negative campaigning. Finally, the findings are discussed.
The professionalisation of political communication
As a major visual means of communication, campaign posters are integrated in wider 
campaigns. Over the past decades, the circumstances for election campaigns as for politi-
cal communication, in general, have changed fundamentally. The concept of profession-
alisation provides a useful theoretical framework to examine the development of political 
communication in Western democracies since the end of World War II. The shift to pro-
fessionalised campaigning in view of these political and media changes has been system-
ised in several phase models. Recently, researchers have distinguished four phases of 
political campaigning (Enli, 2017; Magin et al., 2017; Vergeer et al., 2013), reconsider-
ing established models of three phases (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Gibson and 
Römmele, 2001; Norris, 2000). Partly, they refer to similar developments, but draw on 
concepts such as modernisation (Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2014). In line with Holtz-
Bacha (2002), we regard modernisation as superordinate to the professionalisation of 
political communication. Modernisation comprises the mutually dependent societal 
trends of partisan dealignment and mediatisation. Professionalisation addresses political 
parties’ adaption to partisan dealignment and mediatisation with respect to their organi-
sational structures such as the growing influence of consultants, spin-doctors and adver-
tising agencies as well as their communication strategies (Tenscher, 2013). It basically 
describes a process leading to a high focus on political leaders, less focus on ideology 
and high levels of negativity (Vliegenthart, 2012). Consequently, personalisation, de-
ideologisation and negative campaigning can be assumed as strategies of professional-
ised political communication (Holtz-Bacha, 2002; Schweitzer, 2008).
Generally, political personalisation describes ‘a process in which the political weight 
of the individual actor in the political process increases in the course of time, while the 
centrality of the political group (i.e. political party) declines’ (Rahat and Sheafer, 2007: 
65). In the literature, three different lines of research can be identified: (a) personalisa-
tion of the electoral system (institutional personalisation), (b) personalisation of the paid 
and unpaid media (media personalisation) and (c) personalisation of politicians’ and vot-
ers’ behaviour (behavioural personalisation). Although the German political system 
shows fewer tendencies of institutional personalisation compared to other countries (e.g. 
Israel or the United States) (Rahat and Sheafer, 2007), the differentiation between media 
personalisation (e.g. Reinemann and Wilke, 2007) and behavioural personalisation (e.g. 
Gschwend and Zittel, 2015) fits for the German case. Furthermore, centralised personali-
sation of single leaders and decentralised personalisation of individual politicians who 
are no party leaders can be distinguished. This study concentrates on centralised person-
alisation in a paid medium, defined as an increasing focus on political leaders (political 
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parties’ heads or executive leaders) in parties’ own communication channels such as 
campaign posters (Balmas et al., 2014).
The increase of political personalisation is accompanied by de-ideologisation (Garzia, 
2011). Kirchheimer (1966) describes de-ideologisation in Germany as well as in other 
Western European post-war societies: ‘De-ideologization in the political field involves 
the transfer of ideology from partnership in a clearly visible political goal structure into 
one of many sufficient but by no means necessary motivational forces operative in the 
voters’ choice’ (p. 187). It has been suggested that the hiring of external experts contrib-
utes to rather sales-oriented election campaigns instead of clear-cut ideological political 
communication (Holtz-Bacha, 2002). Accordingly, we assume that political parties refer 
to a lesser extent to the political ideologies of liberalism, conservatism, socialism, com-
munism, nationalism, fascism, ecologism, feminism and religion (Heywood, 2017) and 
their respective symbols (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999) in the course of time.
Nevertheless, political parties aim at mobilising own partisans (Lau et al., 2007) and 
at demobilising adherents of the opponent (Krupnikov, 2011) with negative campaign-
ing. Therefore, political parties try to show that their opponents are not eligible to lead 
the country (Ceron and d’Adda, 2016). In general, directional and evaluative definitions 
of negative campaigning can be distinguished. In line with the directional definition of 
Lau and Pomper (2002), we perceive negative campaigning as ‘talking about the oppo-
nent – his or her programmes, accomplishments, qualifications, associates, and so on – 
with the focus, usually, on the defects of these attributes’ (p. 48). Hence, all references to 
the political opponent are considered negative campaigning. Lau and Pomper (2002) 
described negative campaigning for the two-party system in the United States. 
Nevertheless, this definition considers all references to the political opponent as negative 
campaigning and is, therefore, also suitable for multiparty systems such as Germany.
In the following, the professionalisation of political campaigning and the emergence 
of the strategies linked to this development are examined more closely. In the first phase 
of political campaigning (until 1960), the electorate is characterised by a strong party 
identification and low volatility. Therefore, political parties can easily refer to ideologies 
because political institutions and beliefs are strong (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999). By 
using campaigning tools such as campaign posters, partisan press, and face-to-face-com-
munication (e.g. canvassing), political parties aim at reaching and mobilising voters 
(Gibson and Römmele, 2001; Norris, 2000). Moreover, during the first legislative peri-
ods from 1949 to 1957, different radical left-wing and right-wing splinter parties such as 
the German Communist Party (KPD) and the nationalist German Party (DP) gained seats 
in the parliament. Consequently, besides high levels of ideologisation, low levels of per-
sonalisation can be expected for Bundestag elections in this early phase.
The second phase of political campaigning (1960–1990) differs from the first phase 
especially in terms of the electorate and the growing importance of the media logic. 
Regarding voters, partisan dealignment and an increasing electoral volatility are charac-
teristic during this phase (Dalton, 2014). Confronted with declining party identification, 
political parties need to convince the electorate and address masses instead of only mobi-
lising their own partisans. Political parties such as the Christian Democratic Union/
Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) or the Social Democratic Party (SPD) therefore 
transform into catch-all parties trying to avoid ideological battles in order to appeal to a 
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variety of voters (Kirchheimer, 1966). Despite first attempts of the CDU/CSU in the 
1950s, both major parties establish the outsourcing of their campaign organisation and 
the hiring of external experts in the 1961 election campaign. CDU/CSU and SPD hire 
opinion researchers, PR-consultants and advertising agents. For the first time, profes-
sional advertising agencies are responsible to design and distribute campaign posters 
(Krewel, 2017). The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) is at first the only minor party 
represented continuously in the German Bundestag until The Greens (later Alliance 90/
The Greens) enter the parliament in 1983. Furthermore, this phase is characterised by a 
shift from direct communication between political parties and the electorate to mass 
media communication (Gibson and Römmele, 2001). This development is accompanied 
by the rise of television, introduced in Germany during the 1950s and established until 
1980, leading to a more personalised political communication (Blumler and Kavanagh, 
1999). Especially the introduction of commercial television in the 1980s reinforced 
German political parties’ adaption to media logic (Schulz and Zeh, 2005).
In the third phase of political campaigning (1990–2008), political consultants play a 
more crucial role in the political process (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Gibson and 
Römmele, 2001; Norris, 2000). During this phase, the ties between voters and political 
parties become even weaker. Consequently, the level of electoral volatility as well as the 
number of swing voters and late deciders in Germany increases (Dalton, 2014). With the 
reunification of the two German states, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, later 
The Left) enters the German Bundestag for the first time in 1990. Since 2002, German 
TV broadcasts debates between the chancellor candidates. To address voters as consum-
ers, political parties adopt new marketing techniques and use targeted campaigns (Gibson 
and Römmele, 2001). Hence, this phase describe professional campaigns. The focus of 
political campaigns moves from ideological conflicts to leaders. Besides this personali-
sation, negative campaigning is established as a further strategy of political campaigning 
(Geer, 2012; Norris, 2000). In Germany, especially the SPD’s 1998 campaign led by 
Gerhard Schröder ‘seemed to mark the new era of professionalized campaigning’ (Gibson 
and Römmele, 2001: 35).
Finally, the increasing relevance of social media in political campaigning leads to 
the emergence of newer forms of political communication, a trend current research has 
characterised as the ‘fourth age of political campaigning’ (Magin et al., 2017). The 
developments of ongoing dealignment and mediatisation identified for previous phases 
even intensify with the rise of the Web 2.0. Political parties worldwide hire social 
media experts and integrate digital tools into larger campaigns (Bruns et al., 2015; 
Lilleker et al., 2015), leading to a reinforced professionalisation in view of the new 
digital environment (Enli, 2017). Social media platforms further contribute to the per-
sonalisation of politics, as candidates spread personal messages via social networks 
like Facebook or Twitter (Enli, 2017; Vergeer et al., 2013). However, it has to be inves-
tigated whether an increase in the usage of such strategies can also be observed for 
established tools such as campaign posters. With regard to negative campaigning, pre-
vious research has indicated an extensive use in both online and offline contexts over 
the last years (Druckman et al., 2010). Benefitting from the European refugee crisis 
and the rise of nationalism, the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) comple-
ments the party system in 2017.
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It has to be taken into account that the adoption of professionalised structures and 
strategies varies across countries and that newer tools complement instead of replace 
older tools (Tenscher and Mykkänen, 2014). However, phase models are a useful heuris-
tic to identify long-term trends of political campaigning (Klinger and Russmann, 2017). 
Although professionalised political communication may be characterised by a mixture of 
campaign styles, phase models allow describing predominant patterns of political cam-
paigning in the course of time.
Following this line of argument, one could expect several changes of campaign post-
ers’ characteristics during the period of the study. Considering the specifics of the respec-
tive phases, an increasing focus on political leaders, less ideological references as well as 
a high level of negativity are expected for recent campaigns in contrast to German 
Bundestag elections in earlier phases. Based on these theoretical considerations, we for-
mulate the following six hypotheses:
H1. The (a) use of images and (b) mentioning of political leaders on campaign posters 
increases in the course of time.
H2. The (a) use of ideological symbols and (b) mentioning of political ideologies on 
campaign posters decreases in the course of time.
H3. The (a) use of visual references to and (b) mentioning of political opponents on 
campaign posters increases in the course of time.
Methods
To test our hypotheses, we carried out a quantitative content analysis of both visual and 
textual elements of campaign posters for German Bundestag elections in the period 
between 1949 and 2017. The distinction between visual and textual elements for the 
investigation of campaign posters is in line with a recent study that demonstrates discrep-
ancies between visual and textual parts of posters (Vliegenthart, 2012). To collect the 
sample, we used the archives of the German political party foundations (Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Rosa Luxemburg Foundation), the German 
Federal Archives and the political parties’ official websites. The campaign posters were 
selected by the following criteria: posters had to be (a) distributed nationwide, (b) by 
political parties represented in the Bundestag following the respective election (CDU/
CSU, SPD, FDP, Alliance 90/The Greens, The Left, AfD, and Others) and (c) promoted 
the parties, their programmes or their leaders. These criteria excluded posters showing 
politicians who were neither the political parties’ heads nor executive leaders (e.g. con-
stituency candidates), wall newspapers as well as campaign posters published by the 
political parties’ youth wings or other supporting organisations (e.g. citizens’ initiatives 
or unions). Finally, a total of 1,857 campaign posters for 19 Bundestag elections were 
collected and analysed using a quantitative content analysis.
The campaign posters were coded by six native speaking and trained coders. To assess 
intercoder reliability, a randomly selected subsample of 186 campaign posters was 
coded. By using Krippendorff’s alpha for calculating intercoder reliability (Krippendorff, 
2013), we found satisfactory reliability scores (reported below).
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To measure the strategies of professionalised political communication, we used a set 
of binary variables (0 = absent, 1 = present), which served as dependent variables in the 
following analyses. In line with the definition of centralised personalisation mentioned 
above, the first variable Visual Personalisation indicated whether the campaign posters 
contained an image of a political leader (Krippendorff’s α = .95). Similarly, the second 
variable Textual Personalisation measured whether the text on the campaign poster 
referred to a leader (Krippendorff’s α = .87). The third variable Visual De-ideologisation 
indicated whether campaign posters showed symbols representing political ideologies, 
such as hammer and sickle, red star, or red flag (socialism or communism); the national 
flag or the federal eagle (nationalism); swastika or runic insignia of the Schutzstaffel (fas-
cism); Venus symbol (feminism) and crucifix, crescent, or the Star of David (religion) 
(Krippendorff’s α = .97). The fourth variable Textual De-ideologisation measured 
whether the text on the campaign posters named the political ideologies of liberalism, 
conservatism, socialism, communism, nationalism, fascism, ecologism, feminism, or 
religion (Krippendorff’s α = .79). The fifth variable Visual Negative Campaigning was 
constructed based on Lau and Pomper’s (2002) directional definition of negative cam-
paigning and indicated whether the image on the campaign posters referred to other 
political parties or candidates (Krippendorff’s α = .82). Finally, the variable Textual 
Negative Campaigning measured whether the text on the campaign posters referred to 
the political opponent (Krippendorff’s α = .84). Coding illustrations of the strategies of 
professionalised political communication are given in the Appendix 1.
Due to the binary coding of the dependent variables, logistic regressions were used to 
test the hypotheses. In the logistic regression analyses reported below, the election years 
served as the independent variable. In line with our theoretical approach, we classified 
the election years into categories representing the four phases of political campaigning. 
The first phase covered the post-war period including the Bundestag elections from 1949 
to 1957, followed by the second phase ranging from 1961 to 1987, which was character-
ised by the division of Germany. The third phase included the period after Germany’s 
reunification from 1990 to 2005, while the fourth phase included the latest German 
Bundestag elections from 2009 to 2017. The first phase was chosen as reference cate-
gory. In addition, we included the political parties as a control variable in our logistic 
regression models to assess whether differences between the political parties occur. Due 
to its permanent presence in the Bundestag, we chose the SPD as reference category.
Results
The first set of hypotheses assesses the personalisation of politics on campaign posters in 
the course of time. We assume that both the use of the images of political leaders (H1a) 
and the mentioning of the leaders’ name (H1b) have increased. Figure 1 presents the 
levels of visual and textual personalisation per election year. It becomes apparent that 
images of political leaders were present in all phases of political campaigning. However, 
differences across phases can be identified: During the first phase, political leaders were 
less present on images compared to later phases of political campaigning. Especially in 
recent years, including the latest Bundestag elections from 2009 to 2017, the use of 
images of political leaders has increased. As is shown in Table 1, the results of the logis-
tic regression analysis confirm the increasing visual personalisation on campaign posters 
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in the course of time. The odds of using images of political leaders was 3.635 times 
higher for the second phase of political campaigning than for the first phase. For the third 
phase, the odds of using images of political leaders was 3.750 times higher compared to 
the first phase. Finally, for the fourth phase, the odds of using images of political leaders 
was 8.802 times higher than for the first phase. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a is supported. In 
addition, significant differences across political parties occurred. As compared to the 
SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens had 66.9% lower odds of using images of political leaders. 
Likewise, The Left had 52.9% lower odds of visualising the leaders on campaign posters 
compared to the SPD.
Hypothesis 1b deals with the increasing textual personalisation in the course of time. 
As shown in Figure 1, the mentioning of the leaders’ names was especially present in the 
second phase of political campaigning. This can be explained by the fact that especially 
the election campaign in 1980 was characterised by a strong focus on the two chancellor 
candidates. On one hand, the popularity of the incumbent Helmut Schmidt (SPD) by far 
exceeded the popularity of his party. On the other hand, his challenger Franz Josef Strauß 
(CDU/CSU) was seen as a very controversial and divisive candidate. This led to a highly 
polarised election campaign between the two candidates. However, textual personalisa-
tion did not seem to increase in the later phases compared with the first phase. This obser-
vation is further supported by the results of the logistic regression analysis. Although the 
odds of mentioning the leaders’ name on campaign posters is 2.208 times higher for the 
second phase of political campaigning than for the first phase, the mentioning of the lead-
ers’ name did not increase significantly in the third and the fourth phase.
Consequently, the results do not support Hypothesis 1b. Furthermore, the regression 


















































































































































Figure 1. Levels of personalisation in the course of time.
Scores range from 0 (personalisation absent on campaign posters in the respective election year) to 1 (per-
sonalisation present on all campaign posters in the respective election year).
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Table 1. Predicting strategies of professionalised political communication.
Visual personalisation Visual de-ideologisation Visual negative 
campaigning
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Election yearsa
 1961–1987 3.635*** 2.405–5.493 1.676** 1.157–2.428 0.427* 0.192–0.948
 1990–2005 3.750*** 2.456–5.725 2.994*** 2.047–4.381 0.482 0.216–1.076
 2009–2017 8.802*** 5.566–13.919 3.184*** 2.033–4.988 0.802 0.338–1.901
Political partiesb
 CDU/CSU 1.128 0.848–1.502 6.825*** 4.926–9.456 1.149 0.555–2.381
 FDP 1.460 0.984–2.168 3.057*** 1.973–4.735 1.265 0.448–3.575
 The Greens 0.331*** 0.214–0.511 0.407** 0.229–0.723 3.661*** 1.665–8.047
 The Left 0.471** 0.290–0.764 0.402* 0.216–0.817 1.183 0.352–3.979
 AfD 0.069 0.009–0.530 0.284 0.036–2.214 — —




AUC 0.690 0.784 0.650
N 1,857 1,857 1,857
 Textual Personalisation Textual De-ideologisation Textual Negative 
Campaigning
 OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Election yearsa
 1961–1987 2.208*** 1.561–3.122 1.061 0.616–1.829 0.825 0.550–1.237
 1990–2005 0.973 0.656–1.442 2.083** 1.220–3.555 1.000 0.658–1.518
 2009–2017 1.532 0.981–2.391 0.335 0.136–0.827 0.492* 0.266–0.908
Political partiesb
 CDU/CSU 0.651** 0.486–0.872 3.901*** 2.039–7.461 0.913 0.643–1.297
 FDP 0.780 0.511–1.192 39.385*** 20.530–75.557 0.670 0.382–1.175
 The Greens 0.304*** 0.188–0.491 1.091 0.432–2.759 0.698 0.422–1.152
 The Left 0.485* 0.276–0.852 5.498*** 2.571–11.760 0.198*** 0.077–0.514
 AfD 0.157 0.020–1.218 8.780 0.939–82.052 — —




AUC 0.653 0.810 0.624
N 1,857 1,857 1,857
OR: odds ratio; CI: confidence interval; AUC: area under the receiver operating characteristics curve; 
CDU/CSU: Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union; FDP: Free Democratic Party; AfD: Alterna-
tive for Germany. Logistic regression analyses.
aReference category is 1949–1957.
bReference category is SPD (Social Democratic Party).
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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CSU had 34.9% lower odds of mentioning the name of political leaders. In addition, we 
found that The Left had 51.5% lower odds of mentioning their leaders’ names and Others 
had 74.9% lower odds than the SPD. The logistic regression model also indicates that 
Alliance 90/The Greens had 69.6% lower odds of mentioning the name of political lead-
ers compared to the SPD. The latter is likely to be related to the approach of grassroots 
democracy in the party’s early days.
Overall, our findings suggest an increase in the visual personalisation, while the 
level of textual personalisation remains low. This indicates that political parties assume 
their leaders to be widely known among the electorate so an image is sufficient to rec-
ognise them.
Our second set of hypotheses proposes a decreasing visual ideologisation (H2a) as 
well as textual ideologisation (H2b) on campaign posters in the course of time. As dem-
onstrated by Figure 2, ideological symbols were widely used throughout all phases of 
political campaigning. During the first phase, symbols such as hammer and sickle or red 
stars were used occasionally, whereas a high level of visual ideologisation occurred in 
the second phase. This can be traced back to the tremendous use of the German national 
flag, not only by the conservative CDU/CSU but also by the Social Democrats, espe-
cially during the Bundestag election campaigns in 1976 and 1980. Since 2002, the cam-
paign posters of several political parties have shown an extensive use of the national flag 
again. This surprising observation is supported by Table 1: the odds of using ideological 
symbols on Bundestag election campaign posters was 1.676 times higher for the second 
phase of political campaigning compared to the first phase. In the third phase, the odds 
of using ideological symbols was 2.994 times higher than for the first phase. Finally, the 

















































































































































Figure 2. Levels of ideologisation in the course of time.
Scores range from 0 (ideologisation absent on campaign posters in the respective election year) to 1 (ide-
ologisation present on all campaign posters in the respective election year).
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to the first phase of political campaigning. Overall, we did not detect a decreasing ideolo-
gisation and thus, Hypothesis 2a was not supported. Moreover, we also found systematic 
differences across parties: the odds of using ideological symbols was 6.825 times higher 
for the CDU/CSU than for the SPD. This is due to the fact that the CDU/CSU often used 
national symbols as well as negatively connoted communist symbols. The FDP had 
3.057 times higher odds of using ideological symbols compared to the SPD. As com-
pared to the SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens had 59.3% lower odds of using ideological 
symbols, and The Left had 59.8% lower odds of using ideological symbols.
Similar to the visual level, campaign posters for the Bundestag elections in 1976 and 
1980 displayed an outstanding ideologisation on the textual level (Figure 2). This result 
may be explained by the fact that in the second phase, especially the CDU/CSU used 
several slogans with explicit ideological references such as Freiheit oder Sozialismus 
(Freedom or Socialism) or Sozialismus stoppen (Stop Socialism) to stoke fears of an 
allegedly socialist menace by the SPD. As seen in Table 1, we found no empirical evi-
dence of a decrease in textual ideologisation. Interestingly, the odds of mentioning politi-
cal ideologies on campaign posters was in fact 2.083 times higher for the third phase than 
for the first phase. Thus, Hypothesis 2b was not supported. The logistic regression analy-
sis also indicated systematic variations across parties. The most striking finding was that 
the FDP had a 39.385 times higher odds of mentioning political ideologies compared to 
the SPD. This can be explained by the enormous use of the label Die Liberalen (The 
Liberals) on the FDP’s campaign posters (see coding illustrations). The CDU/CSU had a 
3.901 times higher odds of mentioning political ideologies than the SPD, while The Left 
had a 5.498 times higher odds of mentioning political ideologies compared to the SPD. 
Finally, other parties mentioned political ideologies significantly more than the SPD did. 
This result may be explained by the fact that with the Godesberger Programm (Godesberg 
Programme) in 1959 the SPD dissociated from Marxism and transformed into a catch-all 
party. Consequently, the party tried to avoid ideological references.
Our final set of hypotheses posits an increase of visual negative campaigning (H3a) 
and textual negative campaigning (H3b) on campaign posters in the course of time. 
According to Figure 3, visual negative campaigning only played a minor role on cam-
paign posters across the different phases. Obviously, the use of this strategy varied with 
regard to the respective election. The Bundestag election campaign in 2013, for exam-
ple, was characterised by several attacks on Chancellor Angela Merkel by the opposi-
tion parties SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens. During the latest election campaign in 
2017, no visual attacks were used at all, while textual ones were used only scarcely. It 
is rather unexpected that the AfD did not directly attack the established parties. However, 
the right-wing party primarily concentrated on attacks against minorities such as 
Muslims or refugees.
In the same vein, the results of the logistic regression show no clear trend of an 
increasing visual negative campaigning on Bundestag campaign posters (Table 1). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3a is not supported. Compared to the SPD, only Alliance 90/The 
Greens attacked their political opponents significantly more often on a visual level.
As stated with regard to the visual level, textual negative campaigning played a minor 
role in Bundestag election campaigns as well. No long-term trends could be detected but 
differences regarding the respective election year. In contrast to the other elections, 
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campaign posters for the Bundestag election in 1980 showed a relatively high level of 
textual negative campaigning due to the various attacks on CDU/CSU’s candidate Franz 
Josef Strauß by the SPD as well as by the FDP. The logistic regression model in Table 1 
also indicates that a significant increase of textual negative campaigning on posters in the 
course of time could not be found. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is not supported. For political 
parties, however, we found systematic differences: The Left and also Others had a lower 
odds of mentioning political opponents on campaign posters than the SPD.
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the over-time development of per-
sonalisation, de-ideologisation and negative campaigning by analysing campaign posters 
for German Bundestag election campaigns from 1949 to 2017. The findings show an 
increasing visual personalisation as well as an increasing visual ideologisation across the 
phases of political campaigning, but the level of negativity varies from one election to 
the other without any clear trend. Furthermore, we found no evidence for an increasing 
textual personalisation and textual de-ideologisation. Taken together, these results 
strengthen the idea to distinguish between visual and textual elements of campaign post-
ers (Vliegenthart, 2012).
In terms of personalisation, our findings are in line with previous research that states 
an increasing visual personalisation in parties’ own communication channels such as cam-
paign posters (Vliegenthart, 2012), newspaper advertisements (Balmas et al., 2014) and 


















































































































































Figure 3. Levels of negative campaigning in the course of time.
Scores range from 0 (negative campaigning absent on campaign posters in the respective election year) to 1 
(negative campaigning present on all campaign posters in the respective election year).
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extensively use this strategy of professionalised political communication on campaign 
posters, although only a minority of the electorate can vote for political leaders as their 
local candidates. Despite the wide use of visual personalisation on campaign posters, one 
should consider that the levels of personalisation might differ across parties’ own com-
munication channels and also tend to be even higher in newspaper articles and television 
coverage (Holtz-Bacha et al., 2014; Reinemann and Wilke, 2007; Schulz and Zeh, 2005).
The most striking result of our study is the high level of visual ideologisation. Our find-
ing is contrary to previous studies that have suggested a decreasing ideologisation on 
campaign posters (Vliegenthart, 2012). Although the levels of visual ideologisation 
slightly decreased in 2017, it remains an important strategy of German Bundestag election 
campaigns. Hence, future research has to examine whether the ongoing rise of right-wing 
populism with a re-nationalisation of politics might cause an even stronger ideologisation. 
Obviously, the decreasing relevance of ideological cleavages and the growing influence 
of external consultants do not inevitably lead to de-ideologised political communication. 
In contrast to the established theoretical assumptions, campaign specialists use ideologi-
cal references as a strategy of professionalised political communication.
Furthermore, the longitudinal analysis shows neither a clear upwards nor downwards 
trend regarding negative campaigning but overall low levels of negativity on campaign 
posters. This finding supports previous research on European election campaigns reveal-
ing low or decreasing levels of negativity (Hayek, 2016; Johansson, 2014; Vliegenthart, 
2012). This may be explained by the fact that these countries have multiparty systems in 
contrast to the United States’s two-party system. Political parties are forced to form coa-
lition governments and are thus less likely to attack potential coalition partners. In addi-
tion, differences within parties’ own communication channels and across controlled tools 
and media coverage have to be considered (Elmelund-Præstekær and Mølgaard-
Svensson, 2014; Walter and Vliegenthart, 2010). Similar to personalisation in Germany, 
the level of negativity tends to be higher in newspaper campaign coverage (Reinemann 
and Wilke, 2007) compared to campaign posters.
All in all, political campaigns in Germany can be seen as professionalised, especially 
in terms of high levels of personalisation, although negative campaigning is used to a 
much lesser extent than in U.S. campaigns. The theoretical assumptions regarding de-
ideologisation as a strategy of professionalised political communication have to be 
reconsidered. Based on our findings for political campaigning in a multiparty democ-
racy, more longitudinal analyses in a comparative perspective are needed to systemati-
cally assess whether the German case is outstanding or typical. The first attempts of 
comparisons presented above indicate differences both across communication channels 
and countries. Due to the fact that our study is limited to a single country and a single 
medium, these differences have to be addressed by further analyses considering multiple 
communication channels and different media and political environments. Moreover, the 
integration of qualitative techniques offers further valuable insights into political parties’ 
use of strategies of professionalised political communication. Qualitative analyses might 
identify more implicit uses of negative campaigning such as humour and satire. While 
right-wing populist parties make use of stereotypes of ethnic or religious minorities, 
these attacks can be hardly identified by a quantitative analysis of negative campaigning 
and ideologisation. Qualitative techniques, for instance, allow to distinguish between 
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positive representations of the multicultural society referred to as La deutsche Vita (The 
German Lifestyle) by Alliance 90/The Greens in 2002 and threatening images of refu-
gees on the AfD’s campaign posters for the 2017 Bundestag election.
The findings demonstrate that phase models are helpful to identify predominant pat-
terns and systemise differences over time. Nevertheless, these developments are mostly 
not linear. Therefore, this study provides empirical evidence for the assumption that 
phase models describe different campaign types that are not necessarily limited to spe-
cific time periods. Time periods have to acknowledge the country-specific context, polit-
ical events, and the circumstances of the respective elections. Various aspects have to be 
considered: the parties’ role (government vs. opposition and major vs. minor), the candi-
dates’ characteristics (incumbent vs. challenger as well as popularity and prominence) 
and the closeness of the elections’ outcome.
More generally, our results indicate a visualisation of political communication. The 
discrepancies between the visual and the textual level this study and previous research 
have revealed for single media (Boomgaarden et al., 2016) indicate that the much needed 
comparisons of different communication channels have to take this differentiation into 
account as well. We assume that the visualisation will even intensify with the rise of 
social media campaigning. Furthermore, the growing relevance of social media in politi-
cal campaigning leads to the emergence of newer forms of political communication such 
as online political posters (Lee and Campbell, 2016). Hence, future research has to con-
sider both traditional and online campaigning tools. Especially, traditional campaign 
posters as well as online campaign posters have to be examined from a comparative 
perspective with respect to the strategies of professionalised political communication on 
a visual and textual level.
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Note
1. Alliance 90/The Greens spread 371,000 campaign posters. The Left spent 2,470,000 Euro on 
campaign posters (about 39% of the campaign budget of 6,390,000 Euro). Personal emails 
with the assistant of Alliance 90/The Greens’ national executive director Jeanine Westphal 
and the director of The Left’s party headquarter Claudia Gohde, March 2018.
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Helmut Kohl. Chancellor for Germany.
Source: ACDP, poster collection, 10-001: 1802
3. Visual de-ideologisation
4. Textual de-ideologisation
More FDP, more research.
Source: ADL, audiovisual collection, P1-3075
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Coding illustrations
5. Visual negative campaigning
6.  Textual negative 
campaigning
I do not find the You (“Du”) in CDU.
Source: Alliance 90/The Greens
Appendix 1. (Continued)
